Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act by Butler, Richard
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 7
1978
Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages under the
Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Richard Butler
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Richard Butler, Age Discrimination: Monetary Damages under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 58 Neb. L. Rev. 214
(1979)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss1/7
Comment
Age Discrimination: Monetary
Damages Under the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment
Act
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967 Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA).i This Act "broadly prohibits arbitrary discrimi-
nation in the workplace based on age."'2 Although the ADEA was
enacted over ten years ago, many aspects of the Act are not yet
fully developed. One such aspect is the area of monetary damages.
This article will focus on monetary damages under the ADEA and
in particular deal with the following types of monetary relief: (1)
back pay; (2) liquidated damages; (3) pain and suffering damages;
and (4) punitive damages. As to each type of damages, the central
questions examined will be when and to what extent relief is avail-
able under the ADEA.
Section 626(b) 3 of the ADEA sets forth the type of relief which
may be available to a litigant under the act:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except
for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this
section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed
to be a prohibited act under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a
person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be un-
paid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of
sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages shall
be payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action
brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime com-
pensation under this section. Before instituting any action under this sec-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
2. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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tion, the Secretary shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice
or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the require-
ments of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, confer-
ence, and persuasion. 4
On its face this statutory provision does not provide a direct an-
swer to many of the questions which arise in relation to monetary
damages. For example, it does not specify whether pain and suf-
fering or punitive damages should be allowable. Therefore, in at-
tempting to construe the statute, courts have frequently inquired
as to how the particular issue of damages involved has been re-
solved under similar statutes. In particular, the courts have fo-
cused on the statutes and case law relating to the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII),6 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 for gui-
dance. When such an approach has been used, the underlying
question has been whether it is valid to analogize the relief provi-
sions of the ADEA to each of these other acts.
Recently in a unanimous decision, Lorillard v. Pons,8 the
Supreme Court set forth some guidelines as to how the relief pro-
visions of the ADEA should be construed. At issue in Lorillard
was whether a plaintiff has a right to a jury trial on the issue of
monetary damages under the ADEA. The defendant had argued
that there was no right to a jury trial because there is no such right
under the analogous discrimination law of Title VII. The Court re-
jected this argument and held that the ADEA does give rise to a
right to a jury trial. In reaching this conclusion, the Court under-
took a comparative analysis of the relief provisions of the ADEA,
FLSA, Title VII and the NLRA.
The Court in Lorillard began by noting that the enforcement
scheme of the ADEA is complex. It observed that during the con-
gressional debates on the ADEA, several alternative enforcement
schemes were considered by Congress. Provisions modeled after
the NLRA, Title VII and the FLSA were all considered. The Court
noted that, as enacted, the ADEA was somewhat of a hybrid of
each of these proposals, but concluded that the ADEA was pat-
terned more after the FLSA than any of the other acts and that in
fact the FLSA was incorporated into the relief provisions of the
ADEA to the greatest extent possible.9
The Court conceded that there are important similarities be-
tween Title VII and the ADEA, which are evidenced by their mu-
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
8. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
9. Id. at 580-82.
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tual purpose of eliminating discrimination in employment and by
their substantive prohibitions. However, due to several differences
between the ADEA and Title VII, the Court refused to agree that
the relief provisions of the ADEA parallel the relief provisions of
Title VII.O Nonetheless, because the Lorillard decision arguably
could be limited to the jury trial issue before the Court, compari-
sons to Title VII relief provisions may still be valid for other issues.
The NLRA was not discussed by the Court, other than a refer-
ence to the fact that the NLRA had been considered by Congress
as an alternative enforcement scheme." Due to this lack of treat-
ment, and in view of the substantial connection established by the
Court between the FLSA and the ADEA, it is a fair interpretation
that the Court would generally view NLRA precedents as weak au-
thority for resolving damage issues under the ADEA.
The differences and similarities between the ADEA, FLSA, Ti-
tle VII and the NLRA which the Court in Lorillard examined will
be more fully explored in the following discussions as to each type
of monetary damages. For present purposes, the important point
to be drawn from Lorillard is that a unanimous Supreme Court
decision has raised serious doubts about the proposition that relief
under the ADEA should be generally patterned after Title VII,
while holding that the ADEA should be construed as more akin to
the relief provisions of the FLSA.
II. BACK PAY
Back pay is the fundamental type of relief awardable to an indi-
vidual who has been subjected to age discrimination in employ-
ment. The statutory source for such an award is found in 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b), which states in part that "[a] mounts owing to a person as
a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid
minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for the purpose
of [the FLSA] .-12 On an initial reading, the statutory reference to
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation makes
the statute somewhat unclear as to its import. These are the terms
which are used to designate a back pay award under the FLSA.
Because the FLSA deals with the failure of an employer to pay an
employee either a minimum wage or overtime compensation, in
the context of the FLSA this language clearly translates to an
award of back pay. However, in the context of the ADEA which
also covers employees who do not work under a minimum wage or
overtime structure, the meaning of these terms is not so readily
10. Id. at 583-85.
11. Id. at 578.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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understood. Nonetheless, beginning with Monroe v. Penn-Dixie
Cement Corp.,13 the courts have consistently recognized that the
statute authorizes back pay relief for actions brought under the
ADEA.14
Four issues relating to a back pay award under the ADEA will
be examined: (1) whether an award of back pay is mandatory or
discretionary; (2) what elements make up an award of back pay;
(3) what elements reduce an award of back pay; and (4) within
what time period is a back pay award calculated?
A. Mandatory or Permissive
The ADEA does not expressly state whether a person who has
been successful in an age discrimination claim is automatically en-
titled to a back pay award or whether, instead, the court has some
degree of discretion in determining the propriety of such an award.
Generally, courts have awarded back pay as a matter of course to
successful litigants under the ADEA. However, until recently no
court had expressly addressed the question of whether such
awards were mandatory or discretionary.
An argument in favor of making back pay awards under the
ADEA discretionary can be developed under the theories ad-
vanced in two Supreme Court cases. In Mitchell v. DeMario Jew-
elry, Inc.,'5 the issue was whether the Secretary of Labor, in an
action brought under section 17 of the FLSA,16 could obtain a court
order directing an employer to reimburse employees for wages lost
due to the employer's violation of the FLSA. Section 17 of the
FLSA is silent on the question of back pay, and instead is ad-
dressed to the matter of injunctive relief. The Court held that,
nonetheless, back pay could be recovered in an action under sec-
tion 17.17 However, it indicated that such awards would not be
mandatory, although it did acknowledge that there is "little room
for the exercise of discretion not to order reimbursement."'18
A somewhat similar position has been reached in relation to
back pay awards under Title VII. In Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,19 the Supreme Court held that back pay awards under Ti-
tle VII were not mandatory, but discretionary.20 However, the
13. 335 F. Supp. 231 (ND. Ga. 1971).
14. See § II-B of text infra.
15. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
16. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 15, 63 Stat. 919 (current
version codified at 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1976)).
17. 361 U.S. at 296.
18. Id.
19. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
20. Id. at 421-22.
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Court strongly indicated that only in rare instances would a court
be justified in refusing to make a back pay award to a successful
Title VII litigant.2 '
These two Supreme Court decisions appear to form a basis for
the proposition that, by analogy, back pay awards under the ADEA
should be discretionary rather than mandatory. However, this is
not the state of the law. In the more recent Supreme Court deci-
sion of Lorillard v. Pans,2 2 the Court concluded that back pay
awards under the ADEA were mandatory not discretionary. 23 Ap-
parently, the Court reached this conclusion by first examining sec-
tion 16 of the FLSA which expressly states that an employer "shall
be liable" for amounts deemed as unpaid minimum wages or over-
time compensation.24 The Court must then have noticed that the
ADEA states the act "shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies and procedures" provided in section 16 of the
FLSA.25 It therefore concluded that the ADEA incorporates the
FLSA provision that employers shall be liable for back pay; hence,
the award is mandatory not discretionary.2 6
The logic used by the Supreme Court in Lorillard stands on
firmer ground than the counterarguments which had been devel-
oped pursuant to its previous decisions in Mitchell v. DeMario
Jewelery, Inc.,2 7 and Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody.28 Mitchell
can be distinguished because it arose entirely under section 17 of
the FLSA and, therefore, did not affect the mandatory nature of
the provisions of section 16 of the FLSA. Similarly, Albermarle can
be distinguished on the ground that Title VII by statute requires
that back pay awards be discretionary.2 9 Since the ADEA has no
similar statutory requirement, Lorillard appears to take the appro-
priate position that back pay awards should be mandatory under
the ADEA.
A somewhat related question is whether back pay awards
should be awarded regardless of the type of employment the plain-
tiff previously held. The question arises from the commingling of
the FLSA and ADEA remedial provisions. Under the FLSA, pro-
21. The court stated. "[B]ackpay should be denied only for reasons which, if ap-
plied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradi-
cating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421.
22. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
23. Id. at 584.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
25. Id. § 626(b).
26. 434 U.S. at 584.
27. 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
28. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
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fessionals, administrators and certain other types of employees
are not entitled to back pay relief.3 0 This is not because they are
excluded from the remedial provisions of the FLSA, but because
the FLSA provides an exemption from its minimum wage and
overtime requirements for professional employees.
In Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,31 the employer as-
serted that the employee, who was an engineer, should not be
awarded back pay under the ADEA because he would not have
been entitled to back pay under the FLSA. The court rejected this
argument on the basis that Congress did not intend to incorporate
the exemptions of the FLSA into the ADEA.3 2 The court reached
the correct result because to do otherwise would severely limit the
effective scope of the ADEA.
B. Computation of Back Pay
L Elements Included
Once it is determined that a litigant is entitled to an award of
back pay, the first step in computing the award is to establish what
elements of earnings should be included. The basic formulation
developed by the courts is that everything the employee would
have earned had the discrimination not occurred should be in-
cluded. Hence, the courts have awarded lost wages, in the form of
salary or hourly compensation,33 and commissions.3 4 These
amounts have also been incremented by cost of living increases.35
In addition, the courts have allowed for the recovery of lost fringe
benefits, such as increased pension benefits,36 profit sharing bene-
fits,3 7 and insurance benefits.38 Another item of compensation
which may be recoverable under the ADEA is a lost bonus. How-
ever, there is no definitive authority as to whether bonuses are re-
coverable as an element of back pay under the ADEA if this
30. 29 U.S.c. § 213(a) (1) (1976).
31. 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.). Tex. 1977).
32. Id. at 1128.
33. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Ace Hard-
ware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579
(D.D.C. 1974).
34. See Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
35. Id. at 844.
36. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Coates v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (WD. Va. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff
Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
335 F. Supp. 231 (ND. Ga. 1971).
37. Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
38. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W). Va. 1977);
Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
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element of damage is established.3 9
2. Reductions
After the lost earnings amount has been determined, the sec-
ond step in computing a back pay award is to determine what fac-
tors should operate to offset this amount. The relief provisions of
the ADEA do not expressly state that lost earnings should be re-
duced by any factors. Nonetheless, the courts have carved out sev-
eral items which operate to reduce the amount of a back pay
award.
Actual interim earnings are one of the factors which the courts
have used to offset the amount of lost earnings.4 Hence, if the
plaintiff lost two years of wages because of an employer's discrimi-
natory acts, but worked full time at another position for one of
those years, the back pay award would be reduced by the amount
of earnings from the interim employment. This same rule is appli-
cable in computing back pay awards under Title VII,41 and the
NLRA.42 If Title VII is relied on as authority, it may be possible to
lessen this reduction by expenses which the plaintiff incurred in
finding the interim employment.4 3
One exception to the rule that actual interim earnings should
reduce the amount of back pay has developed in the area of in-
terim income from moonlighting. If the plaintiff has earned money
during the interim from employment which he or she could have
held in addition to working for the defendant employer, these
earnings do not reduce the back pay award. Hence in Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co.,44 the court held that the plaintiff's back pay award
should not be reduced by income which the plaintiff had earned in
the interim from lecturing at night, because the plaintiff could have
received this income even if he had been employed by the defend-
ant during the same time period.45 The moonlighting exception
39. There have been Title VII decisions allowing recovery of bonuses. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). But see
Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (plaintiff not
entitled to Christmas bonuses even though he had received them in preced-
ing years because the giving of Christmas bonuses was optional on the part of
management). The decisions allowing recovery could be used by analogy to
argue that bonuses should be recoverable under the ADEA.
40. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
42. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941). This result was reached
even though the relief provisions of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) do
not expressly require mitigating a back pay award for interim earnings.
43. Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp. 188 (D. DeL 1975).
44. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 317-18.
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has also been applied in Title VII cases.&4
The courts have consistently held that under the ADEA any
severance pay received by the plaintiff from the defendant em-
ployer should reduce the award of back pay.47 However, they have
split on whether vacation pay received from the former employer
should reduce the award.48 Similarly, the authorities are split as to
whether unemployment benefits received should operate as an off-
set against lost earnings. 49 This same split is also evident in Title
VII decisions. 5 0 In NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,5 ' the Supreme Court
held that under the NLRA, a reduction in a back pay award for
unemployment benefits is discretionary. This decision was used in
Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 52 as authority for the con-
clusion that under the ADEA a court has discretion to reduce a
back pay award by the amount of unemployment benefits re-
ceived.5 3
Another question that arises under the ADEA is whether back
pay should be reduced by amounts earnable. Amounts earnable
are not actual earnings but are instead those amounts which could
have been earned by the plaintiff if due diligence had been exer-
cised in seeking alternative employment. Once again the provi-
sions of the ADEA are silent.
The issue primarily comes to the forefront because Title VII ex-
46. Thorton v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974); Bing v. Road-
way Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Concordia Parish
School Bd., 387 F. Supp. 887 (W.D. La. 1975).
47. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va., 1977); Combes
v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Schulz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (ND. Ga. 1973).
48. Compare Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975) (no offset for
vacation pay), and Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655
(W.D. Va. 1977) (no offset for vacation pay), with Combes v. Griffin Televi-
sion, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (allowed offset for vacation pay).
49. Compare Hodgsen v. Ideal Corrugated Box Co., 10 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 744
(N.D.W. Va. 1974) (allowed offset for unemployment benefits) and Schulz v.
Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208 (ND. Ga. 1973) (allowed offset for unem-
ployment benefits) with Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730
(5th Cir. 1977) (no offset for unemployment benefits).
50. Inda v. United Air Lines,Inc.,.405 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (unemployment
benefits should not be deducted); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 1301 (SD. Fla. 1972) (unemployment benefits should be deducted);
Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971) (unemployment
benefits may be deducted); Mabin v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 4 Emp. Prac. Dec.
7768 (WD. Mich. 1971), affd, 457 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1972) (unemployment ben-
efits should not be deducted); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332
(SD. Ind.), rev'd on other grounds, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (unemploy-
ment benefits may be deducted).
51. 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
52. 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. Id. at 736.
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pressly provides that back pay awards are to be reduced by
amounts earnable.54 The argument is that by analogy, such
amounts should be deducted under the ADEA. The weakness of
this strict analogy lies in the fact that Title VII by statute specifi-
cally mandates this resUlt55 whereas the ADEA does not.
The silence of the ADEA is not as formidable a barrier to re-
quiring reductions for amounts earnable as it might appear upon
first impression. The NLRA, the Back Pay Act,56 and other statu-
tory remedial provisions, although similarly silent on this issue,
have all been judicially interpreted to require reduction in back
pay for amounts earnable.5 7 There are also several policy argu-
ments in favor of mitigating the damage award by amounts earn-
able. One argument is that a productive society should be
encouraged; allowing reduction for amounts earnable facilitates
productivity by providing the plaintiff incentive to find work. An-
other argument is that if the plaintiff is not working when he or she
could be, to allow recovery for this period is to allow compensation
for self-inflicted losses.
So far, very few courts have entertained the question of
whether amounts earnable should reduce a back pay award under
the ADEA. However, those opinions which have mentioned the is-
sue have indicated a willingness to make an offset for such
amounts.
In Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,5 8 the Eighth Circuit
indicated that it may be willing to allow such an offset.59 However,
the opinion does not take a firm position on the matter and is
therefore of questionable- precedential value.6 0 In Coates v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co., 6 1 the issue was squarely presented to the
court and resolved in favor of reducing for such amounts. The ra-
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
55. Id.
56. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5595-5596 (1976).
57. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (NLRA); ONeal v. Gresham,
519 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); White v. Bloomberg, 501 F.2d
1379 (4th Cir. 1974) (Back Pay Act); Williams v. Albermarle City Bd. of Educ.,
485 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1973) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Urbina v. United States, 428 F.2d
1280 (Ct. CL 1970) (Back Pay Act).
58. 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).
59. Id. at 565.
60. Plaintiff had been terminated from his employment by defendant. Defendant
offered plaintiff a different job within the company with a substantially lower
salary, but plaintiff refused the offer. The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff
had been terminated because of his age and remanded the case to the lower
court for the computation of damages. Id. at 564. It gave instructions to the
lower court to consider the salary plaintiff would have made in the offered
position in computing the damages.
61. 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
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tionale employed by the court was that because such amounts are
deducted under Title VII, by analogy they should be offset under
the ADEA. The basis for the decision may not withstand further
judicial scrutiny, however, for strict analogies between the reme-
dies of Title VII and the ADEA are subject to attack.62 Nonethe-
less, since strict analogy to Title VII is not the only argument in
favor of deducting amounts earnable under the ADEA, the holding
of the court should not be readily dismissed.
If it is assumed that amounts earnable should enter into the
calculation of a back pay award under the ADEA, the question
arises as to under what circumstances a plaintiff has failed to exer-
cise due diligence to find alternative employment. Obviously a
plaintiff must actively seek alternative employment under this
standard. The more specific question is when will a plaintiff be
held to be justified or unjustified in refusing to accept an offer for
alternative employment.
This issue was examined in Coates v. National Cash Register
Co.63 Therein the court set forth several tests which must be sat-
isfied in order for a back pay award to be reduced because the
plaintiff refused to accept an offer of alternative employment.
First, the offer must present duties, status, responsibilities, work-
ing conditions, and opportunities for advancement comparable to
those of the position the plaintiff has been denied because of age
discrimination. Second, the offer of employment must be specific
and concrete. Third, the plaintiff's refusal to accept the job must
be unreasonable. Under this standard the court in Coates held
that plaintiff's back pay award should not be reduced as a result of
plaintiff's failure to accept alternative employment, because the
job offer related to a non-existing job.6
Once it is determined which amounts fit into a back pay award
and which amounts reduce the award, it becomes necessary to as-
certain the time frame within which these figures are to be in-
serted. It is generally accepted that the beginning point for these
computations is the date on which the plaintiff lost employment
because of age discrimination. However, exactly what constitutes
the final date which the award covers has provoked different re-
sponses.
Under Title VII the courts have alternatively held that the
plaintiff is entitled to back pay up to the date (1) the complaint is
filed,65 (2) the trial begins,66 (3) the court orders back pay or rein-
62. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
63. 433 F. Supp. 655 (WID. Va. 1977).
64. Id. at 662.
65. Hester v. Southern Ry. Co., 349 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
66. Doe v. Osteopathic Hosp., 333 F. Supp. 1357 (D. Kan. 1971).
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statement,67 or (4) the plaintiff actually receives his or her back
pay or is reinstated.68 The fourth alternative is the most recent
and reflects a desire on the part of the courts to make plaintiff
whole by compensating for the actual loss incurred and providing
an incentive for defendant to effectuate the ordered relief as soon
as possible.
Currently, the courts have developed only two alternative views
for establishing the cut off point for back pay awards under the
ADEA. The more widely accepted view is that a back pay award
runs to the date the plaintiff either accepts or rejects reinstate-
ment.6 9 The alternative view is that the trial date is the cut off
point.70 Although neither view goes as far as those Title VII deci-
sions which allow recovery up to the date plaintiff actually receives
relief, there does not appear to be any reason for not extending the
computational time period to such a date for an action under the
ADEA. In fact, such an extension would serve policy reasons
analogous to those recognized by the more lenient Title VII opin-
ions. Therefore, it would seem worthy for future ADEA decisions
to allow for the recovery of back pay up to the date when plaintiffs
either actually receive their back pay award or assume the position
they have been unlawfully denied.
I. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The ADEA expressly provides that in fashioning relief "liqui-
dated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations
of this chapter. ' 71 Liquidated damages double the back pay award,
i.e., they are an additional amount equal to the back pay.72 The
67. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Francis v.
AT & T, 55 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1972).
68. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Stearnfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.
1976); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
69. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975); Coates v. National
Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs.,
398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1208
(N.D. Ga. 1973).
70. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Monroe v. Penn-
Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
In Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okia. 1976),
the action was bifurcated. Trial on the issue of relief commenced two months
after the trial on the issue of liability. The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to back pay up to the date of the trial on the issue of relief.
71. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
72. See Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975). Liquidated dam-
ages do not include an additional amount equal to a pain and suffering award.
See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975),
rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
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provision for liquidated damages is one of the main differences be-
tween the type of relief available under the ADEA and that under
Title VII or the FLSA. Liquidated damages are not available under
Title VI.V3 They are available under the FLSA, but they are
treated in a somewhat different fashion.7 4
Two interrelated issues arise with respect to the award of liqui-
dated damages under the ADEA. One question is whether such
awards are mandatory or discretionary when a willful violation is
established. The second question is what constitutes a willful vio-
lation of the ADEA.
A. Discretionary or Mandatory
In order to understand whether liquidated damages are discre-
tionary or mandatory under the ADEA, it is helpful to first under-
stand the framework in which liquidated damages are awarded
under the FLSA. Section 16 of the FLSA provides that any em-
ployer who violates the minimum wage or overtime requirements
of the FLSA shall be liable for back pay and an additional amount
for liquidated damages. 75 It is important to note that this section
describes a liquidated damages award as mandatory. In 1947 this
scheme was altered by the interposition of section 11 of the Portal
to Portal Act (PPA).76 The PPA provided that in an action for re-
lief under the FLSA, the court no longer had to mandatorily award
liquidated damages, but instead was empowered with discretion
on the matter, if the employer could prove the violation of the Act
occurred in good faith and that there were no reasonable grounds
to believe that his or her actions would violate the FLSA.7 7
The question that arises in ADEA litigation is whether liqui-
dated damages should be treated as mandatory by analogy to the
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976). See notes 75-76 & accompanying text infra.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) provides: "Any employer who violates ... this title
shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case
may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages."
76. Section 11 of the PPA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 260 (1976) and provides:
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to
recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or
liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended, if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that
the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and
that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission
was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated
damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount
specified in section 216 of this title.
77. Id.
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provisions of section 16 of the FLSA, or whether they should be
considered affected by section 11 of the PPA and thus discretion-
ary when good faith and reasonable grounds are present. The
courts have split on this issue. Those that have concluded that the
ADEA incorporates the discretionary elements of the PPA have
relied on two arguments to support this result. One is that the re-
lief provisions of the ADEA state that the Act shall be enforced in
accordance with the powers and remedies provided in section 16 of
the FLSA as amended.7 8 Since section 11 of the PPA amended
section 16 of the FLSA, it is incorporated into the ADEA by the
statutory reference to section 16 of the FLSA as amended.7 9
The second argument which has been advanced in favor of con-
cluding that liquidated damages are discretionary under the
ADEA, is that the legislative history of the Act supports this result.
In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,80 the court viewed the following
excerpts from statements made by Senator Javits as indicating
that liquidated damages should be awarded pursuant to the guide-
lines of the PPA:
The enforcement techniques provided by S. 830 [the bill which became
the ADEA] are directly analogous to those available under the Fair Labor
Standards Act; in fact, S. 830 incorporates by reference, to the greatest ex-
tent possible, the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
We now have the enforcement plan which I think is best adapted to
carry out this age-discrimination-in-employment ban with the least over-
anxiety or difficulty on the part of American business, and with complete
fairness to the workers. I think that is one of the most important aspects
of the bill.8 1
The court in Hays reasoned that "[t] he Senator's reference to 'the
least overanxiety or difficulty on the part of American business'
could hardly have been made if there were an absolute imposition
of liquidated damages, the harshness of which prompted Congress
78. As passed by Congress, the ADEA, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 7(b), 81 Stat. 604
(1967), referred to sections of the FLSA as amended. Section 7(b) stated.
'The provisions of this Act shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in sections 11(b), 16 (except for subsec-
tion (a) thereof), and 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended
. " As with other language in the statute, when the act was codified refer-
ences to sections of the FLSA were deleted and replaced with references to
the relevant sections of the United States Code. Therefore, as codified, 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) does not contain language referring to the FLSA as
amended."
79. See Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Combes v.
Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Chilton v. National
Cash Register Co., 370 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
80. 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F.
Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
81. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (emphasis added).
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to enact section 11 of the PPA."82
Two other courts have taken a contrary view on this issue relat-
ing to liquidated damages. 83 In both instances the issue arose in
the context of whether there was a right to a jury trial on the issue
of damages under the ADEA. The rationale employed to reach this
result is best set forth in Cleverly v. Western Electric Co.,84 in
which the court state&
When Congress enacted the ADEA, it made the "powers, remedies, and
procedures" of Section 216(b) of the FLSA applicable to ADEA actions,
but it did not expressly or by implication, make Section 260 of the Portal-
to-Portal Act applicable to such actions. Rather, Congress merely modi-
fied the strict liability for liquidated damages under Section 216(b) by pro-
viding in Section 626(b) of the ADEA that liquidated damages should be
awarded ". . . only in cases of willful violations . . ." That limitation
would be mere surplusage if Section 260, supra, were intended to apply,
and "[a] statute ought, upon the whole to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insig-
nificant.,'85
The courts which have concluded that the PPA should be incor-
porated into the ADEA have not provided persuasive arguments.
The fact that the ADEA makes reference to section 216 of the
FLSA "as amended," does not in and of itself compel the inference
that the framers of the statute intended to bring in section 11 of the
PPA. An alternative inference which can be drawn is that "as
amended" refers to the various direct amendments which have
been made to section 16 of the FLSA since its inception in 1938.
This interpretation, which is more restrictive, is also supported by
an analysis of section 626(e), which states that "section 255 and 259
of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter."8 6 Both sec-
tions 255 and 259 are a part of the PPA. This is evidence that the
drafters were aware of the existence of the PPA and that where it
was intended to be incorporated, the framers did so expressly. It
would seem that if the drafters had intended to incorporate section
11 of the PPA they would have done so in section 626(e).87
82. 531 F.2d at 1311.
83. Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Cleverly v. Western
Elec. Co., 69 FIRD. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
84. 69 F.R.D. 348 (WD. Mo. 1975).
85. Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1976).
87. In Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), the Court distinguished the remedies
of the FLSA and the ADEA and observed-
By its terms, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) requires that liquidated damages
be awarded as a matter of right for violations of the FLSA. However,
in response to its dissatisfaction with that judicial interpretation of
the provision, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act of 1947
*.. which, inter alia, grants courts authority to deny or limit liqui-
dated damages where the "employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good
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Similarly unpersuasive is the congressional testimony which
has been relied upon by some courts to support the incorporation
of the discretionary provisions of the PPA into the ADEA.88 The
language relied on is too broad to support the specific issue in
question. To say that courts have over relied on legislative history
would be an understatement if relief under the ADEA is to be fash-
ioned on the basis of one Senator's statement that the Act is
designed to effectuate the "least overanxiety or difficulty on the
part of American business. 8 9 This statement does not reflect the
fact that the ADEA was created for the advancement of the inter-
ests of individuals, not business. In addition, it is an inaccurate
representation of the Act because if its intent was to minimize an
employer's concern for liability, the Act would surely not have em-
powered a court to award whatever "legal or equitable relief...
may be appropriate" to effectuate the purposes of the Act.90 Such
broad statutory language is bound to create anxiety and difficulty
for American businessmen.
The statement made by Senator Javits to the effect that the
ADEA incorporates the FLSA "to the greatest extent possible,"91
poses more serious problems. This statement was seized by the
Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons9 2 as a basis for concluding that
the remedial provisions of the ADEA should be considered more
analogous to the FLSA than to Title VII. However, it should not be
readily assumed that the Supreme Court is likely to conclude that
the PPA is incorporated into the FLSA merely because of this par-
ticular statement by Senator Javits.93 There is still room for the
argument that although the ADEA does incorporate provisions of
the FLSA to a great extent, the PPA is one of the exceptions to this
general rule.
Finally, although Cleverly v. Western Electric Co.94 was proba-
bly incorrect in concluding that the incorporation of section 11 of
faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or
omission was not a violation of" the FLSA, § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 260. Al-
though § 7(e) of the ADEA ... expressly incorporates §§ 6 and 10 of
the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act_... the ADEA does not make any refer-
ence to § 11, 29 U.S.C. § 260.
Id. at 581-82 r8. Although the Court did not expressly state that section 11 of
the PPA does not come into play under the ADEA, it has alluded to the possi-
bility of such a conclusion.
88. See text accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
89. 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967). For full text of quote, see text accompanying
note 81 supra.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
91. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967). For full text of quote, see text accompanying
note 81 supra.
92. 434 U.S. at 582.
93. See note 87 supra (text of quote from Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. at 581-82 n.8).
94. 69 F.ID. 358 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
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the PPA into the ADEA would make the willfulness test for liqui-
dated damages superfluous,95 the court's conclusion does raise a
problem. The problem is whether it is desirable to impose a two
tier test in deciding whether liquidated damages should be
awarded. The ADEA expressly establishes one test requiring that
the violation be willful in order for liquidated damages to be allow-
able.96 The question is whether there should be an inquiry on a
second level into whether the employer acted in good faith and
with reasonable grounds for believing that he or she was not violat-
ing the Act. Such a two tier analysis would be an awkward way of
deciding when liquidated damages should be awarded. It would
appear that in departing from section 16 of the FLSA and by re-
quiring that liquidated damages shall only be awarded under the
ADEA when a willful violation has occured, the drafters of the
ADEA envisioned a simpler one tier test approach. Therefore, the
battle as to when liquidated damages should be awarded in a par-
ticular case under the ADEA should not be fought under the ban-
ner of the PPA, but instead won or lost by a determination of what
constitutes a willful violation of the ADEA.
B. Willful Violations
The ADEA does not define what constitutes a willful violation
of the Act. Therefore the courts have been left free to fashion their
own definitions. Generally, in defining the term, the courts have
sought guidance from decisions interpreting the FLSA.
Two provisions of the FLSA are concerned with whether an em-
ployer has willfully violated the Act. The first is section 16(a)
which imposes a criminal penalty for willful violations. 97 The other
is section 255 which extends the statute of limitations for bringing
an action under the FLSA from two to three years if a willful viola-
tion has occurred. 98 It is the latter section which has received the
most attention from the courts, and which has provided the frame-
work within which most FLSA decisions defining willful have de-
veloped.
As promulgated by the courts deciding FLSA issues, the boiler-
95. The court apparently reasoned that if an employer has willfully violated the
act, he or she must also have acted without good faith and without reasonable
grounds for believing that he or she was not violating the act. This is not
necessarily true since it depends on how the word "willful" is defined. For
example, in Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841, 845 (W.D.
Okla. 1976), the court held that the employer had both willfully violated the
ADEA and also acted in good faith and with reasonable grounds for believing
he was not violating the Act.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). See text accompanying note 4 supra.
97. Id. § 216(a).
98. Id. § 255(a).
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plate definition of what constitutes a willful violation is that it is
"'intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from acci-
dental,' and that it is employed to characterize 'conduct marked by
careless disregard whether or not one has the right to so act.' "99
Two questions frequently arise when applying this standard to
a specific fact situation. The first question is what type of knowl-
edge is required. The second is whether it makes any difference if
the employer acted in good or bad faith. The courts deciding FLSA
cases have not always agreed concerning the answer to these two
questions, although a majority view is emerging.
Some courts have required that an employer act with definite
knowledge of the applicability of the FLSA and in bad faith in or-
der for a violation of the FLSA to be willful.100 However, the more
modern view is that neither of these elements are required. The
fact that the employer did not act in bad faith and perhaps in fact
acted in good faith has been rejected as being determinative of
whether an employer has committed a willful violation.101 In other
words, even if employers acted in good faith, they may still be held
to have committed a willful violation of the FLSA.10 2 Similarly, the
emerging view is that definite knowledge of the FLSA is not re-
quired for a willful violation. Instead a broader view is taken that
it is enough if employers knew or should have known that their
actions were governed by the FLSA.103 In the language of some
courts, it is enough if employers have a general awareness of the
99. United States v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 243 (1938). See Nabob Oil
Co. v. United States, 190 F.2d 478 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951);
Bailey v. Pilots' Ass'n, 406 F. Supp. 1302 (ED. Pa. 1976); Hodgson v. Veterans
Cleaning Serv., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 741 (M.D. Fla. 1972), modified on other
grounds sub nom. Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 482 F.2d 1362 (5th
Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
100. See Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139, 1141 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972) (discussion interpreting Krumbeck v. John Oster
Mfg. Co., 313 F. Supp. 257 (ED. Wis. 1970), Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390
(N.D. Fla. 1970), and Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1276
(N.D. Tex 1969) to require definite knowledge and bad faith).
101. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974); Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972); Herman v. Roosevelt
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 843 (ED. Mo. 1977); Bailey v. Pilots'
Ass'n, 406 F. Supp. 1302 (ED. Pa. 1976); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand
Co., 407 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Hodgson v. Eunice Superette, Inc., 368
F. Supp. 639 (W.D. La. 1973); Shearer v. E. Brame Trucking Co., 69 Mich. App.
443, 245 N.W.2d 84 (1976).
102. For example, in Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972), the employer exercised good faith by acting
under the advice of counsel but still was held to have committed a willful
violation of the FLSA.
103. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974); Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang
Sand Co., 407 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Shearer v. E. Brame Trucking
Co., 69 Mich. App. 443, 245 N.W.2d 84 (1976).
[VOL. 58:214
AGE DISCRIMINATION
possible applicability of the FLSA to their actions. 0 4 Thus, where
an employer knew of the existence of the FLSA,105 or requested
legal advice as to whether his or her actions would be lawful, 0 6 or
had been subjected to previous investigations for violations of the
FLSA,1 07 it has been held that the employer had sufficient knowl-
edge for a finding of a willful violation. Important in this regard is
that it need not be shown that employers had knowledge that their
actions would be contrary to the requirements of the FLSA, but
only that they were aware that their actions were subject to the
Act. 0 8
As a general proposition the courts deciding cases under the
ADEA have adopted the fundamental view promulgated under the
FLSA that in order for a willful violation to have occurred, the em-
ployer must have acted intentionally, knowingly and voluntarily.
However, there has been no clearcut agreement as to the degree of
knowledge which is required or as to the importance of the em-
ployer's good or bad faith.
Two ADEA decisions have held that a bad faith evasion of the
ADEA is required in order for a violation to be willful. 09 One
court, following the more liberal view promulgated under the
FLSA, has held that bad faith is not necessary and willfulness can
be found even though the employer thought he was acting prop-
erly or was acting under advice of counsel."10 Similarly, a split
among the courts has developed as to the degree of knowledge
104. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972); Usery v. Goodwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D.
Mich. 1976).
105. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972).
107. Hodgson v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 741 (M.D. Fla. 1972),
modified on other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Serv., 482
F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973); Shearer v. E. Brame Trucking Co., 69 Mich. App. 443,
245 N.W.2d 84 (1976).
108. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974).
109. The ADEA provides that the statute of limitations shall be extended from two
to three years if a willful violation of the Act has occurred. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)
(1976). In Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974), the court
was presented with the issue of whether there were grounds for invoking the
three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the extended statute of
limitations did not apply because a willful violation had not occurred. The
court stated that "bad faith evasion of the Act and definite knowledge of its
applicability" was needed in order to establish a willful violation. Id. at 593.
In Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977), the
jury was instructed on the issue of liquidated damages that it could find a
willful violation if "the acts were 'done voluntarily and intentionally, and with
the specific intent to do something which is forbidden by law.' "Id. at 664. No
liquidated damages were awarded.
110. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
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which is required. One view has been that definite knowledge of
the applicability of the ADEA is required."' Alternatively it has
been indicated that awareness of the possible applicability of the
Act is sufficient. 1 2 Other courts have not clearly articulated their
position on the degree of knowledge and type of faith which is re-
quired." 3
The judicial uncertainty surrounding this issue accents the
need to search for a viable solution. As a starting point it should
be noted that there are problems with a strict application in ADEA
cases of the definition of willful as promulgated under the FLSA.
The majority of the FLSA decisions defining willfulness arose in
the context of whether or not the statute of limitations should be
extended from two to three years. In ADEA cases, the concern is
with the assessment of damages. In each situation, the outcome
depends upon the definition of willfulness which is applied, but the
inquiry in these two varying situations serves different purposes.
Under the FLSA the underlying question is whether the court is
going to allow individuals to have their day in court. Under the
ADEA the underlying question is how reprehensible the defend-
ant's actions were.114 As a general proposition it would seem that
the courts should be more liberal with a statute of limitations
question than in awarding punitive damages. Moreover, some
FLSA decisions have limited the applicability of their definition of
willful to the context of the statute of limitations issue.1 1 5 There-
fore, extreme caution should be exercised in attempting to make a
verbatim application of the FLSA definitions.
In view of the remedial nature of ADEA, an argument can be
made that a liberal interpretation of willful should be applied.
While this position carries some value, upon further analysis it en-
counters difficulties. For example, assume that the more liberal
FLSA view is adopted and willful is defined to include any action
taken by employers with the general understanding that their ac-
111. Bishop v. Jelleff Assocs., 398 F. Supp. 579 (D.D.C. 1974).
112. Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
113. In Combes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976), the
court held that a willful violation had occurred. The court went no further
than defining willfulness in boilerplate terms. A similar result can be found
in Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
114. Liquidated damages under the ADEA are punitive in nature. See note 179
infra.
115. In Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972), which is the leading FLSA case supporting a liberal interpre-
tation of willful, the court expressly limited its holding. Section 216(a) of the
FLSA provides a criminal penalty for willful violations. The court stated that
its definition of willful was not intended to apply to Section 216(a). Id. at
1142.
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tions might be subject to the ADEA. If this were the test, then for
all practical purposes liquidated damages would have to be
awarded in every case because the ADEA requires all employers
to post notices of the ADEA in their place of business in order to
inform employees of their rights under the Act.11 6 Any employer
who complies with this requirement, and all employers covered by
the Act who are supposed to comply, will have a difficult time con-
vincing the trier of fact that they had no idea that their actions
would be governed by the ADEA. The requisite knowledge could
be implied from the presence of the notices. Thus, all or almost all
employers would be subject to liquidated damages. This is clearly
not the result which the drafters of the ADEA intended. If it were
the intended result there would have been no need to impose the
qualification that liquidated damages can only be awarded where
there is a willful violation. The drafters could have merely fol-
lowed the language of section 216(b) of the FLSA and made liqui-
dated damages automatic.
Another argument against adopting such a liberal definition of
willful is based on the fact that if liquidated damages were to be de
facto automatic, the nature of the award would lose part of its puni-
tive nature. Every defendant would end up being treated simi-
larly. An automatic award does not take into account the fact that
one defendant's acts are more reprehensible than another's.
If it is assumed that the most liberal definition of willful should
be rejected, the problem of defining the term still remains. The
boilerplate language that an act must be intentional, knowing and
voluntary1 7 in order to be willful is probably an acceptable stan-
dard. The real issues come up in refining this test on the elements
of knowledge and good or bad faith.
With regard to the element of knowledge, it has already been
shown that the single requirement that employers have general
knowledge that their actions are governed by the ADEA is proba-
bly unworkable. A similar result ensues if it is only required that
employers definitely know that their actions are governed by the
Act. Perhaps a more workable standard would be a requirement
that employers have some knowledge that their actions are con-
trary to the requirements of the ADEA. In other words, that they
knew that they were violating the ADEA. Such a standard would
appear to reach those types of activities which should be punished
while protecting those employers who have no idea that they are
performing an unlawful act. A problem with this test is the matter
of proof. It seems probable that no employers would admit a
knowing violation of the law. Without such an admission it would
116. 29 U.S.C. § 627 (1976).
117. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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be difficult to establish the requisite knowledge. 1 8
Another possible approach would be to couple a low threshold
knowledge requirement with a requirement that the employer
must have acted in bad faith or with a lack of good faith. Such a
hybrid test allows the court to focus its inquiry more broadly. Em-
ployers who knew that their actions would violate the Act would
be subjected to liquidated damages because that knowledge would
also be evidence of bad faith. Additionally, other acts which are
less flagrant but still reprehensible could also be subjected to liqui-
dated damages. However, those individuals who could not be ex-
pected to anticipate the unlawful nature of their actions would be
protected. For example, a person who acts in good faith on the ad-
vice of legal counsel that such actions would not be violative of the
ADEA would be protected.
Because of the flexibility which the minimal knowledge-bad
faith standard offers, it should be employed in determining
whether a willful violation of the ADEA has occurred. It stands on
the middle ground between the extremes of subjecting every em-
ployer who violates the ADEA to liquidated damages and holding
practically no employer liable for liquidated damages.
IV. OTHER LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RELIEF
The remedial provisions of the ADEA expressly state:
In any action brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectu-
ate the purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the lia-
bility for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation under this section.119
This portion of the statute raises the issue whether the language
granting the court power to award such legal or equitable relief as
it deems appropriate allows awards of pain and suffering and/or
punitive damages.
A. Pain and Suffering Damages
The courts deciding ADEA cases have split on whether the
foregoing statutory provision authorizes an award for pain and suf-
118. One instance in which knowledge might be proved without an admission is
when the same defendant has previously been held liable for a similar viola-
tion of the ADEA. Another possible instance would be situations in which
employers have been given advice that their actions will violate the ADEA,
but they ignore this advice and proceed to violate the Act. The advisor would
be a source for evidence indicating that an employer knowingly violated the
act.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
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fering.'20 Currently the preferred view among the circuit courts of
appeals is that such damages are not allowable.121 Nonetheless,
such damages should be recoverable under the ADEA.
Several arguments have been advanced for disallowing pain
and suffering damages under the ADEA. Some of these arguments
stem from an attempt at strict statutory analysis. For example, it
has been reasoned that pain and suffering damages should be dis-
allowed because the ADEA does not expressly state that they
should be recoverable. 122 Similarly, it has been contended that the
statutory provision for legal or equitable relief is not a grant of
power to award additional types of relief, but is instead merely a
restatement of the fact that the court may award liquidated dam-
ages or back pay.123 The legal doctrine which embodies such a
construction is known as ejusdem generis.124 The doctrine was ap-
plied in Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos.,125 in which
the court reasoned that the only legal relief expressly available
under the ADEA is liquidated damages and that, afortiori, dam-
ages for pain and suffering as a legal remedy are precluded. 26 A
similar approach was employed by the Fifth Circuit in Dean v.
American Security Insurance Co., 127 with the slight variation that
120. The following courts have allowed awards for pain and suffering- Walker v.
Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); Coates v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ml. 1977); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 429 F.
Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Combes v. Griffin
Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rogers v. Exxon Research
& Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977). In
Dean and Rogers, the higher court reversed the lower court's holding that
pain and suffering damages were recoverable.
The following courts have held that pain and suffering damages are not
recoverable: Cavanaugh v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.
Tex. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533
(E.D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D.
Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Sant v.
Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
121. See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
122. See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
123. See, e.g., Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
124. BLACK's LAw DIcTioNARY 608 (4th ed. 1968) states:
In the construction of laws. . . , the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are
not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as ap-
plying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.
125. 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
126. Id. at 537.
127. 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
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the court thought that the statutory reference to legal relief related
to the express statutory authorization for back pay awards.128
A somewhat related argument was advanced in Fellows v. Med-
ford Corp.,129 in which the court reasoned that the drafters of the
ADEA provided for liquidated damages as an alternative to al-
lowing for the recovery of pain and suffering awards. The court
believed that to allow both liquidated damages and pain and suf-
fering damages would allow a double recovery by the plaintiff.'30
Another argument against pain and suffering damages has been
developed by analogy to Title VII. In Hannon v. Continental Na-
tional Bank,'3 1 the court started with the premise that the ADEA
and Title VII serve the same purpose of eliminating discrimination
in employment. 32 It then observed that pain and suffering dam-
ages are not recoverable in Title VII actions. Because of the simi-
lar nature of the two acts, the court concluded that pain and
suffering should not be a viable damage element under the
ADEA.133
It has also been held that damages for pain and suffering should
not be allowed because they are awardable for a type of injury
which does not fall within the parameters of the ADEA. In Sant v.
Mack Trucks, Inc.,'3 4 and Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 1 3 5 the courts
reasoned that the ADEA does not extend beyond concerns for the
relationship between an employer and an employee. Pain and suf-
fering awards, which by their nature relate to personal interests
such as body or mental integrity, were disallowed because they re-
late to areas outside the purview of the Act.136
Receiving wider acceptance is the argument that pain and suf-
fering awards should be disallowed on the ground that to allow
them would thwart conciliation efforts. The ADEA follows a proce-
dural scheme which is similar to that found under Title VII. A ju-
risdictional requirement to a private civil claim under the ADEA is
that the aggrieved party must first advise the Department of Labor
128. Id. at 1038-39.
129. 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977).
130. Id. at 202. It should be noted that in expressing its view, the court was also
ruling against allowing punitive damages under the ADEA. It is, therefore,
difficult to discern whether the argument against double recovery was di-
rected toward pain and suffering damages, punitive damages or both.
131. 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977).
132. The soundness of this basic premise is supportable by Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
133. 427 F. Supp. at 217.
134. 424 F. Supp. 621 (ND. Cal. 1976).
135. 424 F. Supp. 1329 (ED. Pa. 1976).
136. Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. at 622; Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.
Supp. at 1336-38.
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or the appropriate state agency of his or her complaint.137 There is
then a waiting period during which the governmental authorities
are to attempt to effectuate a conciliation between the employer
and the aggrieved party. If these attempts are unsuccessful, the
government may proceed with an action against the employer. If
the government does not bring an action, the aggrieved party may
bring his or her own action against the employer. In view of this
statutory scheme, some courts have concluded that there is a legis-
lative preference that age discrimination problems be solved by
conciliation rather than by private civil actions.138 Allowing the
plaintiff to recover pain and suffering damages in a private action
is seen as contrary to such a preference.
Finally, two nonstatutory arguments have been promulgated in
favor of disallowing pain and suffering awards. First, it has been
contended that such damages should be avoided because the
award may exceed the plaintiffs actual injury.139 Second, it has
been observed that the ADEA allows successful plaintiffs to be re-
instated in their former positions. It is argued that the resumption
of work would remove the anxiety and anguish which the plaintiff
had experienced by reason of the discrimination and, therefore,
obviate the need for pain and suffering awards.140
In summary, the following are arguments which have been
used to support disallowing pain and suffering damages under the
ADEA: (1) there is a lack of express statutory authority; (2) the
rule of ejusdem generis is applicable; (3) liquidated damages are
granted in lieu of allowing pain and suffering awards, (4) Title VII
does not allow such recovery; (5) personal interests such as physi-
cal and mental integrity are outside the purview of the act; (6) al-
lowing such damages would thwart the statutory preference for
conciliation; (7) damages may exceed actual injury; and (8) re-
sumption of work via reinstatement removes any anxiety and obvi-
ates the need for such damages.
For each of these arguments there is a counter argument. Thus,
the task becomes one of deciding which argument carries greater
merit. In most instances it will be seen that the counter arguments
for allowing pain and suffering awards are more persuasive.
The fact that the ADEA does not expressly state that pain and
suffering should be compensated does not provide a reason for dis-
137. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1976).
138. See Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Rogers v.
Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977); Hannon v. Continen-
tal Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 1329 (ED. Pa. 1976); Sant v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
139. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
140. Id.
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allowing such damages. The statute does not clearly delineate the
answers to many questions pertaining to damages. For example,
the Act does not expressly state that back pay is mandatory or that
back pay should be reduced by interim earnings. Yet, the courts
have read these concepts into the Act.141
In addition, in Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,142
the court countered the argument that pain and suffering damages
should not be recoverable because they are not expressly allowed
by statute. The court reasoned that the ADEA created a new stat-
utory tort,143 and that a panoply of remedies should arise in rela-
tion to the tort.144 Therefore, it stated that pain and suffering
damages should be recoverable. 14 5 In conjunction with the statu-
tory tort theory, it should also be noted that pain and suffering
awards have been allowed in other types of discrimination cases,
even though there was no express statutory authorization for such
damages. 14 6 Therefore, the lack of explicitness in the statute
should not form a basis for precluding pain and suffering damages.
Similarly, the doctrine of ejusdem generis should probably not
be controlling. Two courts' 47 have argued against its application
because the statute states that a court may award legal relief
141. See § H1 of text supra.
142. 404 F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
143. This conclusion is supported by the fact that statutory discrimination actions
have been characterized as sounding in tort. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 (1974) (Title VIII); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (42 U.S.C. §
1983); Hague v. CIO, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir.), modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (42
U.S.C. § 1983).
144. The court cited Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), in which the Supreme Court
stated.
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well set-
tled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute
provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, the federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.
Id. at 684.
145. 404 F. Supp. at 333.
146. See Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974) (Title VIII);
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974) (Title VIII); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.
1971) (42 U.S.C. § 1982); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970) (42
U.S.C. § 1983); Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200
(ED. Va. 1973), modified, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), af'd, 427 U.S. 160
(1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970),
affd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972) (42 U.S.C. §
1983). For Title VII decisions allowing recovery for pain and suffering, see
note 152 infra.
147. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 953 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
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"without limitation."148 Therefore, the courts concluded that "legal
relief" should not be interpreted to refer only to back pay or liqui-
dated damages. Instead this language was interpreted to allow ad-
ditional remedies. 149
The argument that liquidated damages are provided in lieu of
pain and suffering damages, and that to allow both would permit
double recovery is also erroneous. Since liquidated damages
under the ADEA are punitive, not compensatory, in nature,150
there is no danger of a double recovery because pain and suffering
damages are not a punitive form of relief.
In addition, it is probably error to conclude by analogy to Title
VII that pain and suffering damages should be disallowed under
the ADEA. First, as brought out in Coates v. National Cash Regis-
ter Co.,' 5 ' pain and suffering damages have been allowed in some
Title VII cases. 152 Second, strict analogy to Title VII on this point
is not statutorily permissible. Title VII differs from the ADEA in
that the former only empowers a court to award other appropriate
equitable relief.153 The importance of this distinction is revealed
in the recent Supreme Court decision in Lorillard v. Pons,5 4 in
which the Court used this difference as a basis for refuting the ar-
gument that there should be no right to a jury trial under the
ADEA because there is no such right in Title VII actions. 5 5 More-
over, some courts use this statutory difference between Title VII
and the ADEA as a basis for distinguishing Title VII decisions
148. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
149. 433 F. Supp. at 664- 432 F. Supp. at 953 n.1.
150. See note 179 infra.
151. 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977).
152. See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Rosen v. Pub-
lic Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 95-96 (3d Cir. 1973); Humphrey v. South-
western Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973). It would still
be fair to say that the majority of Title VII decisions do not allow pain and
suffering damages.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) states:
The court may... order such affirmative action as may be appropri-
ate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
employment agency or labor organization, as the case may be, re-
sponsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equi-
table relief as the court deems appropriate.
(Emphasis added.)
154. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
155. Id. at 583-85. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). At one point in the legislative
development of the ADEA the statute only provided for other equitable re-
lief. It was later amended to provide for both equitable and legal relief. See
113 CONG. REc. 2199 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 2467 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 31,248-
49 (1967). In Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1977), the plaintiff was unsuccessful in arguing that this amendment indi-
cated an intent to allow pain and suffering damages.
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which have disallowed pain and suffering awards. The rationale is
that because pain and suffering damages are a form of legal relief,
they may not be perceived as under Title VII because Title VII
only provides for other equitable forms of relief. 156 In sum, it can
be seen that the argument that pain and suffering damages should
not be allowed under the ADEA because they are not allowed
under Title VII does not withstand close scrutiny.
Next there is the argument that pain and suffering damages
should not be allowed because the ADEA is limited to the area of
employer-employee relations and, therefore, does not encompass
concern for an employee's physical or mental integrity. This argu-
ment flies in the face of the legislative history of the ADEA which
is replete with references to a concern for the emotional and physi-
cal well-being of people who have been subjected to age discrimi-
nation.157 In fact it is the legislative history of the ADEA which
156. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 333 (D.N.J. 1975)
rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
157. Remarks made by legislators during the deliberations on the bill are indica-
tive of this concern:
Senator Javits:
Mr. President, it is a sad day indeed when a man realizes that the
world has begun to pass him by .... But it is surely a much greater
tragedy for a man to be told, arbitrarily, that the world has passed
him by, merely because he was born in a certain year or earlier,
when he still has the mental and physical capacity to participate in it
as energetically and vigorously as anyone else.
113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967).
Senator Young-
I long have felt it is a particular tragedy to amputate a human be-
ing's function, to strip productive persons of their skills, cheating
them of the dignity of continued self-support. These are the conse-
quences of a forced retirement.
Id. at 31,256 (emphasis added).
Rep. Eilberg-
The financial and social costs, of course, are nothing compared
with the costs in terms of human suffering and welfare which come
about as the result of discriminatory practices in employment
because of age .... Self-esteem, self-satisfaction, and personal
security are important by products of employment in industrial
America. To deny a person the opportunity to compete for jobs on
the basis of ability and desire, solely because of unfounded age
prejudice, is a most vicious, cruel, and disastrous form of inhumanity.
Id. at 34,745 (emphasis added).
Representative Dent-
Mr. Speaker, this waste of humanity is so indecent and unneces-
sary. It is indecent because pure and simple age discrimination is
among the important factors that cause serious economic and per-
sonal problems of unemployed workers ....
Id. at 34,747 (emphasis added).
Representative Pepper.
"[Although it] is difficult to prove that physical or mental illness can
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several courts have used as a basis for their conclusion that pain
and suffering damages should be recoverable. 158 In addition, the
statutory statement of findings and purpose for the ADEA reflects
that the Act encompasses concern for mental injury.159 Therefore,
it is apparent that the argument that the ADEA does not encom-
pass concern for an employee's mental and physical well-being is
not valid. Instead the legislative history of the Act reveals that the
Act was intended to reach such interests.
be directly caused by denial of employment opportunities .. . few
physicians deny that such a relationship exists."
Id. at 34,751 (quoting position paper of the American Medical Association).
Representative Dwyer.
[I]t is up to Congress to help relieve the anxieties that beset millions
of the middle-aged and eliminate the obstacles that stand in the way
of full opportunity for all.
When a man or woman of 55, for instance, loses his job, he faces
the prospect of long months of frustration,fear, and insecurity as he
searches for a new one.... The cost of such an experience in terms
of mental anguish, family suffering, lost income and damaged self-
respect is too high to measure. One must observe it at firsthand-as I
am confident many of our colleagues have-to appreciate how
painful and how unnecessary it all is.
[ iJ]ob discrimination hurts not only the deprived applicants
but the employers and our economy and society as well.
This is especially true when discrimination consists of the blunt,
blind refusal, rigid and unbending, to employ workers once they have
passed an arbitrary age, however able or qualified they may be. As
we have seen, such a closed-door policy only adds to long-term un-
employment, higher relief costs, and extensive human suffering and
despair.
Id. at 34,751-52 (emphasis added).
Two Presidents have also recognized that age discrimination results in in-
jury to personal interests. In a speech on the problems of age discrimination,
President Johnson remarked that "the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in
happiness and well-being which joblessness imposed on these citizens and
their families." 113 CONG. REC. 34,744 (1967) (Rep. Kelly quoting President
Johnson, Older American Message to the Congress, Jan. 23, 1967).
In 1974 the ADEA was amended to extend its coverage to include state and
local government employees. President Nixon supported this amendment
and stated that age discrimination "is cruel and self-defeating; it destroys the
spirit of those who want to work and it denies the National [sic] the contribu-
tion they would make if they were working." H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 40 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2849
(quoting President's Speech of Mar. 23, 1972).
158. Coates v. National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655, 664 (W.D. Va. 1977);
Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 955-56 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 328-33 (D.N.J. 1975),
rev'd, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (3) (1976) states: "[T]he incidence of unemployment, espe-
cially long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale,
and employer acceptability is, relative to younger ages, high among older
workers." (Emphasis added.)
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The contention that pain and suffering damages should be dis-
allowed because they would thwart conciliation efforts has been
refuted in several decisions. In Coates v. National Cash Register
Co.,160 this argument was dismissed by observing that "[d] amages
for emotional distress have been held available under Titles VII
and VIII of the Civil Rights [Acts] of 1964 and 1968, respectively,
even though conciliation is the primary means of enforcement
under these Acts.' 61 In Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 162
the court promulgated an additional counter argument, stating
that "the dangers of ineffective conciliation efforts must be bal-
anced against the injustice of leaving without remedy a class of
injuries recognized by Congress in drafting the ADEA .... More-
over, the statutory pattern cannot be truly said to reject private
civil actions in favor of conciliation efforts." 16
3
The position that pain and suffering damages should be denied
because the award might exceed actual injury is also somewhat
specious. If this were a valid reason for disallowing such relief,
pain and suffering damages might be disallowed in many types of
legal actions. Moreover, the legal system is designed with safe-
guards to protect against the possibility that an award for pain and
suffering might exceed actual injury. First, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the existence of such damages before the issue
may even get to the trier of fact. Second, in a jury trial, the jury
instructions are a mechanism by which the actions of the jury can
be restricted. Third, the trial court has the power to modify a ver-
dict which is not supported by the evidence. In view of these safe-
guards the court in Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,16 was
correct when it stated that "the possibility that a jury may misap-
ply the law should not justify the abandonment of one of the objec-
tives of the statute, nor the surrender of a legal weapon provided
by Congress.' 165
Finally, there is the argument that pain and suffering damages
are unnecessary because these injuries are rectified by reinstate-
ment. The obvious fallacy with this argument is demonstrated in
the following statement:
It may be true that a return to work will go a long way towards halting
the anxieties resulting from age-discrimination. But reinstatement or pro-
motion serves primarily to put a temporal end to the illegal conduct, while
an award of back pay acts to make the victim financially whole. Neither
remedy compensates the previously undergone mental trauma and so-
160. 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977).
161. Id. at 664.
162. 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
163. Id. at 955.
164. 432 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
165. Id. at 954.
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matic effects of a prohibited discharge. Yet it is apparent that these mat-
ters are equally within the concern of Congress and covered by the
statutory purpose. Whatever the prospective psychological effect of the
remedies sanctioned by the Third Circuit panel, they will not work expost
facto to eradicate the prior mental and physical injury.166
In summary, it can be said that the statutory language of the
ADEA does not expressly resolve the question whether pain and
suffering damages should be allowed. The crucial factors are the
statutory authorization for legal relief and the legislative history of
the Act. In view of these two factors it would seem that pain and
suffering damages should be allowed. This result is more
favorable than to render the statutory language superfluous and to
ignore the legislative history. If this result does not in fact comport
with the intention of the drafters of the ADEA, they can more
clearly express their intention by a legislative amendment.
B. Punitive Damages
Although some courts deciding ADEA cases have awarded pu-
nitive damages, 167 the clear majority have not.168 The arguments
for and against punitive damages are similar to those which have
arisen in relation to pain and suffering damages, but with some
new twists.
Punitive damages are a form of legal relief. Therefore, as with
pain and suffering damages, the statutory touchstone for punitive
damages is the provision for appropriate "legal relief." This statu-
tory language permits the argument that punitive damages should
not be deemed to be authorized by this provision because of the
doctrine of ejusdem generis.169 However, for the same reasons that
this doctrine of statutory construction was rejected in the context
of pain and suffering awards,170 it should be rejected in the context
of punitive damages. Similarly, the argument has been made that
allowing punitive damages would thwart the statutory preference
166. Id. at 954.
167. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); Dean v. American
Security Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (ND. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1977); Murphy v. American Motor Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga.
1976), rev'd, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978).
168. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Fellows v.
Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199 (D. Or. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union
Assurance Cos., 428 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Jackson v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.IK, 14 Emp. Prac. Dec. 7784 (SD. Ala. 1977); Harmon v. Continental
Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F.
Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
169. The argument was employed in Jackson v. Illinois Cent. Gulf 1JR., 14 Emp.
Prac. Dec. 7784 (SD. Ala. 1977), to reach the conclusion that punitive dam-
ages are not allowable.
170. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
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for conciliation. 17 1 However, this argument is as unpersuasive in
the context of punitive damages as it is in the context of pain and
suffering damages. 172
The arguments for allowing punitive damages under the ADEA
also parallel some of the arguments that have been developed by
proponents of pain and suffering awards. They are (1) that the
statutory reference to appropriate legal relief allows for any type
of legal relief including punitive damages; 173 (2) that because the
ADEA creates a new statutory tort, a panoply of remedies should
arise in conjunction with the tort;174 and (3) that since punitive
damages are allowed at common law unless restricted by statute,
they should be made available to ADEA litigants because the stat-
ute does not prohibit them.175 Although these latter two argu-
ments have some merit, the best argument for allowing punitive
damages is that the statute means what it says when it states the
court has the power to award legal relief which it deems appropri-
ate.
The arguments for allowing punitive damages are not as strong
as those for allowing pain and suffering damages. Absent is a leg-
islative history which clearly supports such awards. Similarly,
there is a stronger argument that the absence of an express statu-
tory statement authorizing punitive damages indicates that Con-
gress did not intend that they should be available. Several cases176
have seized on the fact that in Title VIII (Fair Housing) 17 7 and the
Equal Credit Act, 7 8 which were enacted in relative proximity to
the ADEA, Congress expressly provided for punitive damages. In
view of this fact, these courts concluded that Congress must not
have intended to allow punitive damages, or it would have ex-
pressly done so. This argument should probably not be dispositive
on the issue of punitive damages under the ADEA since it assumes
that Congress will act consistently in drafting legislation, a weak
premise for any argument. Because the legislative process is flex-
171. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Jackson v.
Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 14 Emp. Prac. Dec. T 7784 (S.D. Ala. 1977).
172. See text accompanying notes 161 & 163 supra.
173. See Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); Dean v. Ameri-
can Security Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036 (5th
Cir. 1977).
174. See Murphy v. American Motor Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976),
rev'd, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978).
175. Id.
176. Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977); Hannon v.
Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1977); Jackson v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 14 Emp. Prac. Dec. 7784 (S.D. Ala. 1977); Platt v. Burroughs
Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1976).
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ible, dynamic, and everchanging, it is unreasonable to assume that
Congress will treat the question of punitive damages similarly in
different items of legislation.
The most forceful argument against allowing punitive damages
is that the ADEA expressly allows liquidated damages. Although
there might be some question as to whether liquidated damages
should be viewed as compensatory in nature, the better view is
that liquidated damages under the ADEA are a form of punitive
damages. 7 9 Because of the punitive nature of liquidated damages
under the ADEA most courts have concluded that Congress pro-
vided for liquidated damages in lieu of punitive damages.180 In
conjunction with this it has been argued that to allow a plaintiff to
recover liquidated damages and punitive damages would -create a
form of double recovery on the part of the plaintiff.181
If it were not for the presence of liquidated damages under the
ADEA, there would be a good argument for punitive damages. The
statutory basis for such an award is present. But the real dilemma
which is presented is that to allow punitive damages creates the
179. In Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942), the Supreme
Court held that liquidated damages under the FLSA were not punitive but
compensatory in nature. The Court reasoned that liquidated damages were
compensatory in that the "retention of a workman's pay may well result in
damages too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate other than by liqui-
dated damages." Id. at 583-84. However, the Overnight holding predates the
1947 Portal to Portal Act modifications to liquidated damages under the FLSA
and thus is probably no longer good law. See § fl-A of text supra. The PPA
modified liquidated damage awards under the FLSA to make them reducible
if it is shown that the employer acted in good faith. As a result of the good
faith test, liquidated damages under the FLSA now seem to be punitive
rather than compensatory in nature. The present test focuses on the nature
of the employer's actions rather than the employee's injury, and thus the
award becomes a form of punishment for and a deterrent against reprehensi-
ble conduct of employers.
Similarly, liquidated damages under the ADEA focus on the nature of the
employer's acts rather than the injury to the employee, and therefore are pu-
nitiye in nature. Liquidated damages are allowable under the ADEA only if
the employer has "willfully" violated the Act. Supporting this conclusion is
congressional testimony by Senator Javits. See text accompanying note 81
supra.
Under the FLSA there is a criminal penalty for a willful violation of the
Act. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (1976). The original draft of the ADEA included a
similar criminal provision. However, this was later eliminated by an amend-
ment to the bilL The following statement by Senator Javits supporting this
amendment buttresses the conclusion that liquidated damages were in-
tended to serve a punitive purpose under the ADEA. "[Tlhe criminal penalty
in cases of willful violation has been eliminated and a double damage liability
substituted. This will furnish an effective deterrent to willful violations
...." 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1967).
180. See note 168 supra.
181. Id.
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potential injustice of double recovery, whereas in order to disallow
punitive damages, the statutory language referring to appropriate
legal relief must be rendered surplusage. The suggested resolution
to this problem is that the focus of the courts should be on the
statutory terms "appropriate legal relief' with the emphasis on the
word "appropriate."
Consider the following hypothetical situation. An employer
willfully violates the ADEA by firing an employee because of his
age. The employer's acts are so outrageous that under normal cir-
cumstances an award of $25,000 in punitive damages would be ap-
propriate. The employee was not earning much money at this job,
so his back pay award amounted to only $10,000. Because the vio-
lation was willful, the employee would also be entitled to $10,000 in
liquidated damages under the ADEA. This $10,000 which, in effect,
represents a form of punitive damages, is $15,000 less than the
$25,000 that normally would have been awarded as punitive dam-
ages. Conversely, if punitive damages were allowable, it would be
appropriate to assess the employer an additional $15,000 in puni-
tive damages. This would not be a double recovery although the
employee would be receiving two amounts which reflect a punitive
purpose, since the total amount would be $25,000, the amount the
situation called for initially. Thus, it can be seen that the mere fact
that Congress provided for liquidated damage awards does not
preempt the need for a separate award of punitive damages. In ad-
dition, it can be seen that a separate award of punitive damages
does not in all instances create a double recovery.
Now consider the same hypothetical with one slight variation.
Assume that the employer's acts only merited a total punitive
damages award of $5,000 to $10,000. The total amount of recovery
would be encompassed by the award of liquidated damages. In
this situation the court should not allow a separate award for puni-
tive damages because it would, in effect, permit a double recovery.
The third situation which should be considered is one in which
the employer violates the ADEA, but the violation is not willful.
No award of liquidated damages could be made because the viola-
tion was not willful. Should a court be able, nonetheless, to make
an award of punitive damages? The better answer would be no. If
an employer could be monetarily punished regardless of whether
he or she willfully violated the Act, the express provision of the
ADEA that liquidated damages shall be awarded only in the event
of a willful violation becomes meaningless.
The better rule would be that when a willful violation of the
ADEA has occurred and liquidated damages are awardable, puni-
tive damages may be awarded if appropriate, but not if they would
create a double recovery. Conversely, where the violation is not
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willful and no liquidated damages are awarded, punitive damages
should not be allowable. This approach honors the fact that liqui-
dated damages under the ADEA are punitive in nature and that
double recovery should be disallowed. At the same time it gives
meaning to the statutory grant of power to award appropriate legal
relief.
There is some judicial authority for this approach. Two of the
ADEA decisions which have allowed recovery of punitive damages
have conditioned the award on the presence of a willful violation of
the Act.182 In another ADEA decision, which disallowed punitive
damages, the court stated that it did so because there was no evi-
dence that the defendant had acted in bad faith.183 The decision
implies that if bad faith had been shown, punitive damages might
have been recoverable. Since a bad faith test is analogous to a will-
fulness test,184 this decision probably supports the conclusion that
punitive damages should only be available if a willful violation has
occurred. However, neither of these decisions takes the additional
step and limits punitive damages for willful violations to those in-
stances in which the award would not create a double recovery.
In summary, punitive damages should be allowable under the
ADEA, but only under limited circumstances-where a willful vio-
lation of the Act has occurred and liquidated damages are
awarded, but are inadequate to punish the defendant to the extent
he or she deserves.
V. CONCLUSION
This comment has examined the issues which arise in relation
to monetary damages under the ADEA. In some instances the
courts have been in harmony as to how a particular issue should
be resolved, and the law is fairly well established. However, the
courts have not been in complete harmony concerning most of the
damage issues under the ADEA. This comment has advanced a
somewhat liberal interpretation of the ADEA regarding these is-
sues. It has been suggested that liquidated damages, pain and suf-
fering awards, and punitive damages should be awarded, not only
because they are supported by persuasive arguments but because
it makes sense to make such damages available to a person who
has been subjected to age discrimination. A wide spectrum of
types of relief provides a degree of flexibility in fashioning awards
which lends itself to the different factual circumstances in which
182. Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 437 F. Supp. 730 (D.S.C. 1977); Murphy v. Ameri-
can Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 570 F.2d 1226
(5th Cir. 1978).
183. Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (ED. Ark. 1976).
184. See text accompanying note 182 supra.
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age discrimination appears. Since the ADEA is a remedial act, a
wide range of damages should be available in the absence of com-
pelling arguments in favor of severely restricting the type of dam-
ages recoverable. It is not suggested that the doors should be
opened wide to allow for liquidated damages, pain and suffering
damages, and punitive damages in every instance. But it is con-
tended that each of these types of damages should be available for
application in appropriate circumstances. If Congress finds that a
liberal judicial construction of the relief provisions of the ADEA is
contrary to its original intent, a legislative amendment could al-
ways be advanced which more specifically limits the type of relief
available under the ADEA.
Richard Butler '78
